The Chemical and Industrial Corporation v. Utah State Tax Commission : Reply Brief of Plaintiff by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1961
The Chemical and Industrial Corporation v. Utah
State Tax Commission : Reply Brief of Plaintiff
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jerry L. Cowan; Frost & Jacobs; Attorneys for Plaintiff;
David E. Salisbury; Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy; Of Counsel;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, The Chemical and Industrial Corp v. Utah State Tax Comm., No. 9360 (Utah Supreme Court, 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3833
IN' THE 
Supre•e Court of the State of Utah 
No. 9360 
THE CHEMICAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
JERRY L. CowA.N, 
FROST & JACOBS, 
Defen.dant. 
2300 Union Central Building, 
Cincinnati 2, Ohio, 
A..ttorneys for Plaintiff. 
r:Jf Counsel: 
~AVID E. SALISBU:a.Y, 
' VANCoTT, BAGLEY, CoRNWALL & McCARTHY, 
65 South Main St., 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah. 
THE ]OHNSON & HAKDIN Co., LAw PRINTERs 
CINCINNATI, OHIO 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . 1 
I. Passage of Title to the Materials Is Con-
trolled by Article XVIII of Plaintiff's Con-
tract, Not by the Provisions of the Contract 
Between United States Steel Corporation 
and Blaw-Knox Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
II. Defendant's Interpretation of the Meaning 
and Effect of Article XVIII of the Contract 
Between Plaintiff and the Blaw-Knox Com-
pany Is Erroneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
III. Defendant's Argument that There Was a 
Taxable Moment When Plaintiff Was the 
Owner of the Materials and Subject to a Tax 
Is Not Supported by the Authorities 6 
IV. The Contention of the Defendant that Plain-
tiff Was Present in the State of Utah Is 
Without Basis in Fact, and There Is No 
Authority for Such Position in Law 7 
V. The Terms of the Contract Between United 
States Steel and Blaw-Knox Were Not Am-
biguous, and the Testimony Elicited from 
Mr. Gage Was Improper 10 
VI. Conclusion ................. . 
CITATIONS OF AUTHORITY 
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, ETC. 




Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Johnson 6 
Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas 7 
l 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PAGE 
Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas 9 
Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L. R.R. v. Wallace .. 4, 5 
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 · 
Southern Pac. Co. v. Gallagher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Southern Pac. Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission 6 
Union Pacific R.R. v. Utah State Tax Commission 6 
REGULATIONS, ETC. 
Sales and Use Tax Regulation No. 58 3 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
No. 9360 
THE CHElVIICAL AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ARGUMENT 
I. Passage of Title to the Materials Is Controlled by 
Article XVIII of Plaintiff's Contract, Not by the Pro-
visions of the Contract Between United States Steel 
Corporation and Blaw-Knox Company. 
Although plaintiff generally agrees with defendant's 
statement of facts in so far as they purport to summarize 
various provisions of the contracts, the reason or necessity 
for such analysis, particularly with reference to the con-
tract between Columbia-Geneva Division, United States 
Steel Corporation and The Blaw-Knox Company, remains, 
as it has throughout the proceedings, unclear. As defend-
ant points out at page 3 of its brief, the time of passage 
of title to the materials purchased is critical, yet nowhere 
in the contract between United States Steel and Blaw-
Knox is there any provision which purports to deal with 
this question. Repeated discussion and emphasis on pro-
visions of this contract by the defendant which clearly 
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deal with matters extraneous to the matter of passage 
of title, tends only to confuse the real question in issue 
here. 
The attempt by the defendant to read into the contract 
between United States Steel and Blaw-Knox a provision 
which does not exist stems from its position "that it is 
impossible to impose upon United States Steel Corporation 
terms to which it did not agree." Apparently, the defend-
ant is of the opinion that no one can be subjected to a 
liability for the payment of taxes unless it expressly agrees 
to the imposition of such taxes. In this opinion the 
defendant is obviously in error. These taxes are imposed 
by law, as enacted by the legislature of the State of Utah, 
and as interpreted by the courts of this state. The parties 
to a contract do not and cannot impose such taxes. They 
can only contract in such a manner as to either effect their 
dealings or transactions in such a way that liability under 
the law is more or less clearly imposed upon one party, 
or they may agree that one party will bear the ultimate 
liability for such taxes. 
United States Steel Corporation, with knowledge that 
there would be subcontracts of the work to be performed 
under the prime contract, was not in a position to exercise 
complete control over the transactions which would result 
in tax liability under the law. It was, however, in a posi-
tion to protect itself from the ultimate liability for the 
payment of any taxes. This it did by the inclusion of 
Paragraph 15 of its contract with Blaw-Knox which 
required Blaw-I{nox to indemnify and hold it harmless 
from liability for any such taxes. It thereby imposed the 
economic burden of the taxes on Blaw-Knox, and thus 
eliminated from consideration an element of price that was 
contingent and uncertain. 
In the same manner, plaintiff, by limiting its liability 
to taxes "levied upon" it, restricted the area of its 
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ultimate liability for the payment of such taxes. This was, 
as it is in all such contracts, an important factor in the 
prices quoted by The Chemical and Industrial Corporation 
in its bid for the job. It is plaintiff's position in this mat-
ter that there can be no valid levy of a use tax against it. 
An examination of the provisions of the contract quoted 
by the defendant separately, or of the instrument as a 
whole, fails to support the defendant's contention that title 
to the materials did not pass to United States Steel Cor-
poration until "final acceptance" of the work. Paragraph 
1 entitled "Description of the Work" is no more than that: 
a description of the duties of the contractor. Paragraph 12 
simply places the obligation of insuring the work during 
construction on the contractor, a standard provision in 
many construction contracts. Paragraph 4 is a typical 
default provision, authorizing the owner to complete the 
contract in the event of a default of the contractor. 
The defendant has placed considerable emphasis on 
Paragraph 24, relating to the final acceptance of the work. 
Apparently it is its contention that no interest in the 
facility passed to United States Steel Corporation until it 
accepted the plant pursuant to Paragraph 24. The fallacy 
of this reasoning has been discussed in detail in plaintiff's 
original brief and it would serve no useful purpose to pro-
long the discussion of this point here. Suffice it to say 
that the quoted portion of this provision set forth in 
defendant's brief at page 11 makes it quite clear that 
"acceptance" relates only to· an agreement on the part of 
the owner that the operating plant rneets the specifications 
contained in the contract as to operating performance and 
efficiency and as to the quality of the finished product pro-
duced by the plant. 
The further reference to Sales and Use Tax Regulation 
Xo. 58, as a basis for imposing liability on The Chemical 
and Industrial Corporation in this instance, is particularly 
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inappropriate here since this Regulation, in its quoted 
form, was not approved until May 27, 1959 and is expressly 
made effective only on or after July 1, 1959. Prior to this 
time the predecessor of this particular regulation was ex-
pressly made applicable only to the sales tax, and did not 
contain the second sentence set forth in the quoted material. 
II. Defendant's Interpretation of the Meaning and Effect 
of Article XVIII of the Contract Between Plaintiff 
and the Blaw-Knox Company Is Erroneous. 
As plaintiff indicated in its original brief, and contrary 
to the statement of the defendant at page 16 of its brief, 
plaintiff contends that the title to the materials here 
involved passed upon delivery, rather than at the time 
they were delivered and stored at the site. Plaintiff be-
lieves, however, that irrespective of whether title passed 
upon delivery or at the time the materials were delivered 
and stored, no taxable moment existed when plaintiff 
could be subjected to liability for the tax imposed in this 
case. If plaintiff is correct that title passed upon delivery, 
then any reference to the provisions of the use tax law 
relating to storage are extraneous. But even if title did 
not pass until the materials were delivered and stored, 
there would still be no taxable moment when plaintiff was 
subject to the tax. 
Plaintiff has shown that even a tax on storage, in order 
to be valid, must be a tax imposed on the exercise of a 
right of ownership in property. In the present context, the 
question then becomes: ·when were the materials stored~ 
The answer is, of course, when they were placed on the 
ground at the job site after the termination of their 
transit in interstate commerce. Mud Control Laboratories 
v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P. 2d 854 (1954), cited at 
page 13 of plaintiff's brief. At this precise instant title 
to the materials was in the United States Steel Corporation. 
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In this connection, your attention is directed to the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Nashville, 
Chattanooga & St. L. R.R. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 
(1933). Here the State of Tennessee asserted liability for 
an excise tax on the storage of gasoline imported by the 
petitioner from other states and unloaded by it into storage 
tanks from which it was subsequently withdrawn and used 
by petitioner to provide motive power for its equipment 
used in interstate operations. In upholding the tax, the 
Court stated at 266: 
The gasoline, upon being unloaded and stored, 
ceased to be a subject of transportation in interstate 
commerce and lost its immunity as such from state 
taxation .... The oil in storage was not a subject of 
interstate commerce and so was a part of the common 
mass of goods within the state, subject to local taxa-
tion. 
And again at pages 267-8: 
The power to tax property, the sum of all the rights 
and powers incident to ownership, necessarily includes 
the power to tax its constituent elements .... Hence, 
there can be no valid objection to the taxation of the 
exercise of any right or power incident to appellant's 
ownership of the gasoline, which falls short of a tax 
directly imposed on its use in interstate commerce. 
Here the tax is imposed on the successive exercise of 
two of these powers, the storage and withdrawal from 
storage of the gasoline. 
Thus, it is apparent that for tax purposes, storage does 
not take place until the materials are placed in storage. 
Furthermore, it is equally clear that in order for the tax 
to apply, the storage must be that of the owner of the 
property. In the present case, the essential element of 
ownership was lacking, and, therefore, the tax cannot be 
applied to the plaintiff. 
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III. Defendant's Argument that There Was a Taxable 
Moment When ·Plaintiff Was the Owner of the Ma.-
terials and Subject to a Tax Is Not Supported by the 
Authorities. 
The defendant relies principally on the decisions in 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 167 (1939) and 
Pacific Telephone .& Telegraph Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U. S. 
182 (1939) to support its contention that plaintiff was 
the owner of the materials during a taxable moment when 
it was subject to the tax sought to be imposed here. An 
analysis of these cases and the decisions following and 
interpreting them, however, do not support this contention. 
These decisions of the Supreme Court clearly taxed the 
exercise of two rights of ownership: (1) storage, or the 
retention of materials after the interstate transit ended; 
and (2) use, or the subsequent installation of the materials 
in the taxpayer's operations, both of which occurred sub-
sequent to a "taxable moment" after the delivery of the 
materials and after the interstate transportation of them 
ended. This is the interpretation placed on these cases by 
this Court. See Union Pacific R.R. v. Utah State Tax 
Cmnntission, 110 Utah 99, 169 P. 2d 804 (1946) and 
Southern Pacific Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 106 
Utah 451, 150 P. 2d 110 (1944). 
Further, in this connection the language of the court 
in the decision of Chicago Bridge.& Iron Co. v. Johnson, 19 
Cal. 2d 162, 119 P. 2d 945 (1941) cited by the defendant, 
is particularly appropriate. Here, the petitioner, a builder 
of storage tanks and qualified to do business in California, 
shiped tanks in a ''knocked down'' condition to a point 
at or near its customer's premises where they were 
unloaded and stored pending reassembly by plaintiff on 
the site. In holding plaintiff subject to the California use 
tax, the court stated at 170, 119 P. 2d at 949: 
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In the instant case the tax was levied on the storage 
and use of the materials which were purchased and 
fabricated into tank parts, that storage and use con-
sisting of the time after the materials arrived and 
while they were awaiting assembly and erection by 
the plaintiff, and the subsequent installation and 
erection thereof. The interstate transit had ended 
when the tank parts arrived at their destination near 
and/ or adjoining the customer's premises and awaited 
assembly in so far as their being subject to the tax 
was concerned. That was the commencement of the 
taxable moment; that was the taxable intrastate event 
which occurred after the interstate transit had ceased. 
(Emphasis added.) 
IV. The Contention of the Defendant that Plaintiff Was 
Present in the State of Utah Is Without Basis in Fact, 
and There Is No Authority for Such Position in Law. 
The defendant has apparently based its contention that 
plaintiff was present in the State of Utah solely upon the 
basis of a decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the 
United States some 33 years ago, and which decision does 
not involve the application of a use tax but rather is con-
cerned with a question of the validity of the imposition 
of a fine or penalty for failure to timely qualify to do 
business within the State of Arkansas. The defendant has 
quoted at length from this decision in support of its con-
tention that plaintiff was engaged in business in the State 
of Utah. 
Upon closer examination of the facts involved in this 
decision, Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 
269 U. S. 148 (1925), the dissimilarity between the situa-
tion which existed there and in the present case becomes 
quite obvious. In addition to the fact that the Court was 
concerned with the application of a penalty provision for 
failing to qualify to do business at the proper time rather 
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than with the application of a state use tax, it is apparent 
from the opinion that the Kansas City Structural Steel 
Company, against whom the penalty was assessed, went 
considerably further in. its operations within the State 
of Arkansas than has plaintiff here in the State of Utah. 
In that case, the plaintiff submitted a bid to a governmental 
agency in Arkansas for the construction of a bridge in 
that state. The bid and the contract covering the work 
were executed in Arkansas. Materials were shipped from 
Missouri to a point near the site of construction in 
Arkansas and were received by the plaintiff at this point. 
Thereafter such materials were delivered by the plaintiff 
to its subcontractor and were ultimately used in the per-
formance of the contract. 
In the present case plaintiff submitted no bid to anyone 
in the State of Utah nor was any bid accepted or contract 
executed within the State of Utah. Nor did plaintiff here 
subcontract only a portion of the work retaining some 
actual construction work itself as did the plaintiff in the 
Kansas City Structural St·eel Company case. All work 
to be performed by plaintiff under its subcontract with 
the Blaw-Knox Company was sublet to The Chemical and 
Industrial Construction Company and plaintiff's subcon-
tractor was required under the terms of its contract with 
plaintiff to undertake not only all construction work but 
the receipt, unloading, and hauling of all 1naterials to be 
used in connection with the work. 
The materials purchased by plaintiff and ultimately used 
in the work were addressed and shipped to The Chemical 
and Industrial Construction Company at the job site near 
Geneva, Utah. Not only did plaintiff not receive the 
materials in Utah, it also did not undertake any actual or 
physical delivery of any materials to its subcontractor. In 
contradistinction to this it would appear from the opinion 
of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
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that the plaintiff in Kansas City Structural Steel Company 
case was actually present and made actual physical deliv-
eries of the materials to its subcontractor. This is appar-
ent from the following quotation from the case contained in 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 161 Ark. 
483, 256 S. W. 845 at 847: 
Here the facts warranted the trial court in finding, 
and evidently it did find, that the appellant shipped 
the materials necessary in the construction of this 
bridge to Dermott, and there established the emporium 
or warehouse, from which it furnished to the Yancey 
Construction Company all the material the latter com-
pany required to do the work under its contract. 
Thus, the basis for the Court's determination that the 
interstate shipment had ended is clear. The materials had 
been shipped to some point near the construction site, 
and there received by the plaintiff and stored temporarily 
until they were subsequently actually and physically deliv-
ered by the plaintiff to its subcontractor as they were 
needed in the course of construction. This is an entirely 
different situation from that involved in the present case 
where the only interruption in delivery from points outside 
the State of Utah to the job site was a possible change 
in the mode of conveyance from rail to truck. 
Plaintiff is at a loss to understand the basis for the 
defendant's contention that the decision in Kansas City 
Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas, supra, a decision rendered 
thirty-three years ago, not involving the application of 
either a use or sales tax, and not even mentioning the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
can be urged as authority for the proposition that the 
attempted exaction of a use tax from plaintiff in these 
circumstances is a valid exercise of the taxing power and 
authority of the State of Utah and not proscribed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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V. The Terms of the Contract Between United States Steel 
and Blaw-Knox Were Not Ambiguous, and the Testi-
mony Elicited from Mr. Gage Was Improper. 
The defendant attempts to justify the questions directed 
to Mr. Maynard Gage, an employee of United States Steel 
Corporation, and the answers elicited from him on the 
ground that the contract between United States Steel 
Corporation and the Blaw-Knox Company was ambiguous 
and incomplete. No attempt was·ever made by the defend-
ant to establish, as a foundation for the admission of such 
evidence, the ambiguity of the contract, and certainly, the 
introduction of the evidence could not be sustained on the 
ground that the contract was incomplete. Plaintiff believes 
that it is obvious that the defendant was simply trying 
to add to the contract a provision it did not contain. 
To say that because the plaintiff cited a provision of 
this contract as evidencing as much support for plaintiff's 
position as other provisions of the same contract cited by 
the defendant supported it, is in itself evidence of the 
ambiguity of the contract is evading the question. Plain-
tiff's complaint is simply that defendant, by trying to 
establish its position by reference to certain provisions of 
the contract which do not purport to deal with the matter 
the defendant seeks to establish, creates ambiguity. This 
is the natural and inevitable consequence of trying to add 
to the contract a provision which is not there. The ambig-
uity is not in the contract itself, but only arises from the 
defendant's attempts to prove that two plus two equals five. 
Although not related specifically to any particular point 
here involved, the defendant at page 18 of its brief urges 
the affirmance of the decision of the State Tax Commission 
on the ground that to rule otherwise would be tantamount 
to. opening the flood gates of tax avoidance to the great 
detriment of intrastate contractors and sellers of such 
materials. Plaintiff submits that this is not the case. First, 
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plaintiff wishes to make it quite clear that the avoidance 
of the payment of the use tax in this instance was not the 
reason for conducting its business in the manner in which 
it is carried on. This method of operation was in effect long 
before the project for United States Steel Corporation at 
Geneva, Utah was even contemplated. The design and the 
construction of complicated petro-chemical complexes are 
two separate and distinct operations, requiring different 
types of personnel, methods of operation, etc. Second, a 
holding that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of the 
use tax in this proceeding is not the· equivalent of saying 
that no tax is due as a result of the construction of these 
facilities. To the contrary, it seems entirely plausible 
that someone other than the plaintiff may well owe such a 
tax. But liability cannot be imposed upon the plaintiff 
simply because a tax may be due and owing as a result of 
the construction work. Finally, even if it was determined 
that no tax was due in this instance by anyone by reason of 
a gap or omission in the law, it is not the function of 
either the State Tax Commission or the courts to remedy 
the situation. The remedy lies with the legislature of the 
State of Utah. 
VI. Conclusion. 
Plaintiff submits that in the light of the facts and the 
authorities there exists no basis for the imposition of lia-
bility for the payment of the use tax in this instance on 
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the plaintiff, and that accordingly, the decision of the State 
Tax Commission should be reversed. 
Of Counsel: 
Respectfully submitted, 
J E,RRY L. CowAN, 
FROST & J .A COBS, 
2300 Union Central Building, 
Cincinnati 2, Ohio, 
Attorneys for Plain.tiff. 
DAVID E. SALISBURY, 
VAN CoTT, BAGLEY, CoRNWALL & McCARTHY, 
65 South Main St., 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah. 
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